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A major issue in the design of  both public and private pension plans 
involves the indexation of  benefits to price-level changes. A major pur- 
ported virtue of  current public pensions in the United States is that they 
provide an asset with a fixed real return. This is regarded as important 
because  of  the absence of  an indexed  bond  market. It is frequently 
alleged that the failure to provide indexed benefits is a major weakness of 
standard private pension arrangements. These views have influenced the 
recommendations of  groups such as the President’s Commission on Pen- 
sion Policy (1980) and the Advisory Council on Social Security (1979). 
Both these groups, without detailed argument, strongly endorsed the 
indexation of  social security benefits. 
Serious consideration of issues regarding indexation requires the care- 
ful specification of an alternative to  indexing. It is clearly naive to suppose 
that social security benefit levels would never be adjusted in the absence 
of  indexation or that real benefits would never be adjusted in the pres- 
ence of indexing. It also requires recognition of three fundamental  princi- 
ples of  modern finance. First, as the Modigliani-Miller theorem demons- 
trates, repackaging risk  does not  make it go away. Provisions which 
insure pension recipients against some risks impose these same risks on 
the bearers of  pension liabilities. Second, risk associated with an asset 
cannot be measured  in isolation but depends on the covariance of  its 
return with other economic events. Third, the consumers’ objective is to 
reduce total risk, not to insulate themselves completely from any one 
source of uncertainty. While these principles are widely recognized, they 
have not informed many previous analyses of  pension policy. 
This chapter examines some positive  and normative aspects of  the 
inflation indexation of public and private pensions. A major conclusion of 
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the analysis is that alternative indexing arrangements may have far less 
impact on actual patterns of risk bearing than is usually thought to be the 
case. Insofar as inflation indexing has real effects, there is no presump- 
tion that they are beneficial. In particular, the precommitment aspects of 
public indexing may be quite undesirable. There are sound reasons to 
believe that voluntarily agreed on, nonindexed private pensions may be 
efficient. Nonindexed pensions may result in an efficient allocation of 
risks given the other assets and liabilities of  pension issuers and ben- 
eficiaries. In this case, indexation would impede the efficient allocation of 
risks. 
Discussions of  indexation in most contexts invariably focus only on 
inflation indexation.  The reasons for this narrow focus are not  clear. 
Consumers’ objective is to minimize uncertainty about their well-being, 
not just to be free from inflation risk. It is certainly possible to imagine 
indexing public or private benefit  levels to variables other than  price 
indices. In this chapter I develop an intertemporal cost-of-living index 
(ICOLI) which  is  superior to conventional price  indices as a way  of 
evaluating the changes in  real well-being,  associated with  changes in 
wealth. The use  of  this  measure  has  significant  implications  for  the 
indexation of pensions and for the question of what assets should be held 
in pension portfolios. 
The plan of  the chapter is as follows. The first section analyzes the 
inflation indexation of public old age pensions. Under standard assump- 
tions of either complete legislative discretion or perfect capital markets, 
there will be no real effects arising from the indexation of  social security 
benefits. If enough imperfections are introduced for indexation to have 
real effects, there is no presumption that they will be desirable. I argue 
that, in the context of public pensions, indexation should be thought of 
primarily  as a kind  of  “no real benefit  cut” precommitment. Such a 
precommitment can have the perverse effect of holding down the size of 
the program. 
The second section examines issues connected with the indexation of 
private pensions. Because of the noncoercive nature of private pensions, 
there are important differences from public pensions. Again, however, it 
is demonstrated that if capital markets are perfect, indexation of benefits 
will  have no real effects.  Once imperfections of  a kind  which permit 
indexing to have real effects are introduced,  it is exceedingly unlikely that 
full indexing will be optimal. Indeed, some crude empirical calculations 
suggest that fixing nominal  benefit  levels  may  result  in  efficient  risk 
sharing. 
The third section of the chapter extends the analysis by considering the 
possibility of indexing pensions benefits to variables other than the rate of 
inflation.  There appear to be other sources of  aggregate uncertainty 
which are more important than inflation. A major source of uncertainty 
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of future consumption and so raise the sustainable standard of living. The 
merits of  indexing benefits to a price index which includes the price of 
future consumption  are assessed. The practicality  of  this proposal  is 
examined briefly. 
The fourth and final section of the chapter summarizes the results and 
examines their policy implications. A brief discussion of  Robert Merton’s 
proposal that social security benefits be indexed to aggregate consump- 
tion concludes the chapter. 
9.1  Indexing Public Pensions 
This section considers the effects of  indexing the benefits in public 
pensions to the price level. Consideration of the possibility of indexing to 
an alternative aggregate magnitude is deferred to the third section. The 
analysis here focuses on the effects of changing the size of the program in 
response to changes in the price level. The issue of indexing in the design 
of  benefit formulas is not considered.’ 
Since 1972, the social security program has in some sense been indexed 
to the price level.2  The indexation scheme first enacted was conceptually 
flawed and led benefits to rise much more rapidly than prices. The error 
was repaired in new legislation in 1977, which has been gradually phased 
in. At present, benefits for current recipients are indexed on an annual 
basis. In July of each year, benefits are increased by the annual rate of 
CPI inflation over the preceding 12 months.  Several advisory groups, 
including most recently the President’s Commission on Pension Policy 
(1981), have recommended that the frequency of benefit adjustments be 
increased. 
Arguments in favor of indexing the level of public pension benefits do 
not appear to be very well developed. The argument seems to be that 
indexing benefit levels provides insurance for beneficiaries against the 
effects of  inflation. Little attention is given to the possibility  that this 
insurance can be provided through private financial transactions. Fre- 
quently the consequences of alternative indexing arrangements for the 
risk characteristics of  tax liabilities are not considered. Without consider- 
ing these facets of  the problem, it is impossible to evaluate the merits of 
indexing public pension benefits. 
For clarity it is useful to consider the necessary conditions for indexing 
benefits to have any real effects at all. This is most easily done recognizing 
the following pair  of  “Indexing  Irrelevance  Propositions”  for public 
pensions. 
Proposition 1: If  benefits can be adjusted continuously to desired real 
levels, indexing arrangements will have no real effects on any economic 
variables. 
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bonds and nominal bonds exist, indexing arrangements  will have no real 
effects, even if  benefits can be adjusted only periodically. 
The first proposition is obvious once stated. Regardless of  indexing 
arrangements, real benefits  will  be  set  at their  desired level  at each 
instant. The form of  indexing arrangement will affect whether benefit 
changes are or are not necessary, and their magnitudes, but will have no 
impact  on real benefit  levels.  A  similar argument  suggests  that  in a 
competitive spot labor market, indexing in wage contracts will have no 
real consequences. This proposition establishes that for indexation to 
have real effects, benefits can only be adjusted periodically or that some 
types of  legislated benefit adjustments (i.e., real benefit cuts) are not 
permitted. These possibilities are considered below. 
The  second  proposition  is  equivalent  to  the  Modigliani-Miller 
theorems for indexed bonds proved by Liviatan and Levhari (1977). It 
can be demonstrated as follows. Assume that a consumer has wealth W,, 
which he allocates to consumption and various portfolio assets in order to 
maximize 
(1)  EU(C,  W,)  s.t. W,=  X(1 + ri)Ai  + B, 
where C is consumption, W, is terminal wealth, ri is the real return on 
asset i, Ai  is investment in asset  i, and B represents real social security 
benefits, which may be uncertain. Suppose,  for concreteness, that asset 1 
is the riskless indexed bond and asset 2 is an otherwise riskless nominal 
bond. Then, when benefits are indexed, in order for them to have the 
same real value, the condition B,,,  = Breal(l  + r2)/(1  + rl)  must hold.' 
Now,  supposing  that this  condition does hold, consider any feasible 
allocation (C,A)  when social security is not indexed. The same terminal 
yealth distribution can be %btained  if social security is indexed by taking 
Al = A,  -  Breal/  (1 + r),  A2 = A,  + Brea,/(l  + r)  and making no other 
portfolio changes. A similar argument can be used to show that switching 
from indexed to nonindexed benefits does not change the feasible set. It 
follows that indexing has no real effects under the stated conditions. The 
argument could be extended to consider taxpayers' behavior and show 
that indexing has no general equilibrium effects. 
This proposition is clearly not literally applicable to the real world since 
indexed bonds do not exist. However, it is an open question whether or 
not portfolios of assets with near constant real returns can be formed. If 
so the irrelevance proposition here will continue to hold. Even in the 
absence of  indexed bonds, or the capacity to manufacture  them from 
existing  assets, individuals  can  undo the effects of  nonindexation  by 
borrowing to purchase real durable assets. Thus it seems likely that, at 
least to  the extent that individuals have access to the capital markets, they 
can negate many of  the effects of indexing arrangements. 
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tions in conjunction with rigidities in adjusting benefit levels are a neces- 
sary condition for indexation to have real effects. We now consider the 
case where individuals have no access to indexed bonds or any close 
substitute and where benefits are subject to infrequent adjustment. 
9.1.1  Indexation as Insurance 
If a program can be legislatively modified only infrequently, indexation 
of  benefits will provide insurance against unexpected developments be- 
tween legislative adjustments. The importance of this insurance depends 
on the amount of  unexpected variation in the price level which takes 
place between legislative adjustments. Table 9.1 reproduces a chronol- 
ogy of legislative changes in social security benefit formulas. It is clear 
from the table that benefit adjustments are very common, occurring on 
average every 4 years. It is useful to get an idea of  how far out of line 
benefits can be over intervals of this length. The likely error in forecasts 
of  the average price level over various horizons can easily be estimated. 
Forecasts based on estimates of  expected inflation were generated by 
applying an ARMA (1,l) process to annual rates of  CPI inflation for 
1947-75.  The root mean square forecast error rises from 1.1% with  a 
1-year horizon to 4.2% with  a 5-year horizon. These numbers do not 
suggest that indexation mitigates an otherwise important source of uncer- 
tainty and may seem surprisingly small.  Suppose, however,  that one 
misestimated the annual inflation rate over a 5-year period by 3%. The 
average error in estimates of  the price level would only be 7.5%. 
For two reasons, even these figures overstate the importance of  any 
real uncertainties generated by the nonindexation of benefits. First, the 
timing of  benefit  readjustments is  endogenous. When  the price-level 
innovation is large, adjustment of benefits can be accelerated. This means 
that large undesired changes in real benefit levels are unlikely. Second, 
and more important, benefit adjustments can take account of  losses or 
gains suffered during the preceding period. For simplicity, assume that 
the target level of real benefits is a constant 6. Now assume that benefits 
are adjusted each period. Then suppose that in each period benefits are 
set to satisfy the expression 
(2)  E(B,) = B + (1 +r)[B,-, -  E(&l)]. 
It follows that 
(3) 
That is, the uncertainty in the present value of benefits received by an 
individual (the second term in [3])  is much smaller than the uncertainty 
associated with benefits in any given year. 
Assuming that individuals have a capacity to borrow and lend at the 236  Lawrence H. Summers 
Table 9.1 
Act 
1977  Modified to distribute total creditable wages in years 1937-50ovcr  1-14 years, with 
4-14 increment years assumed. Table in the Act (as deemed effective for Dccem- 
bcr 1978) relating PIB’s to PIA’s frozen for workers who attain age 62, become 
disabled. or die after 1978. Cost-of-living  adjustments applicable in year worker 
attained age 62 and after, or if earlier, year worker became disabled or died 
applied to December 1978 PIA’s. Effective for June 1979. increase of 9.9% in 
current benefit levels. Effective  fbr  June 1980, increase of 14.3% in current benefit 
levels. Effective for June 1981, increase of  11.2% in current benefit levels. 
[Formula applies to AMW computed for period after 19501 
1950 
1952 
50% of  first $100 plus 15% of  next $200. Effective for April 1952. 
55% of first $100 plus 1.5%  of next $200. Effective for Seppternber 1952. increase of 
12’/2%’. but not less that $5 in current benefit levels. 
1954  55% of first $llOplus  20% of  next $240. Effective for September 1954, increase of at 
least $5 (current benefit levels increased by approximately 139). 
[Underlying formula appearing (or deemed to appear) in table in the Act] 
1958  58.85% of first $1 10 plus 21.40% of next $290. Effective for Junuary 1959. increase 
62.97% of  first $110 plus 22.90% of next $290 plus 21.40% of next $150. EjJective 
71.16% offirst $110plus25.88% ofnext $290plus24.18% ofnext $150plus28.43% 
of  next $100. Effective  for  Februury IYh8,  increase of at least 13% in benefit level. 
81.83% of  first $llOplus29.76% ofnext $290plus27.81% ofnext $150plus32.69% 
of  next $100. Effective for  January 1970. increase of at least 1.5% in benefit level. 
90.01% of first $llOplus  32.74% ofnext $290~1~~  30.59% ofnext $15Oplus35.96% 
of next $100plus 20% of  next $100. Effective  forJanuary 1971, increase of  10% in 
benefit level. 
108.01% of  first $110 plus 39.29% of  next  $290 plus 36.71% of  next  $1.50  plus 
43.15%’ of next $100 plus 24% of  next $100 plus 20% of  next $250. Effective for 
September 1972, increase of 20% in benefit level. (Provision for future automatic 
“cost-of-living” increases.) 
114.38% of  first $110 plus 41.61% of  next  $290 plus 38.88% of  next  $150 plus 
45.70%1ofnext $100plus25.42% ofnext $100plus21.18%ofnext$250plus20% 
of next SO. Effective for June I974 through December 1974 but never upplicuble. 
Increase of  5.9% in benefit lcvcl eliminated by  1973b legislation. 
119.89% of  first $110 plus 43.61% of  next  $290 plus 40.75% of  next  $150 plus 
47.90% of next $100 plus 26.64% of next $100 plus 22.20% of next $250 plus 20% 
of next $100. Increase of  11% in 1972a benefit levels, effective in 2stepst 7%,  for 
March-May  IY74; 470 additional, forJune 1974. (Beginning  June 1975. subject to 
automatic “cost-of-living” increase, under modification of  1972 provision.) Plus 
20% of  next $7.5. effective for January 1975. 
of  the greater of  7% or $3 in benefit level. 
1965 







129.48% of  first $110 plus  47.10% of  next  $290 plus 44.01% of  next  $150 plus 
51.73% of  next $100 plus 28.77% of next $100 plus 23.98% of  next $250 plus 
21.60% of next $175. Effective forJune 1975, increase of 8% in benefit level. Plus 
20% of next $100. effective for Junuary 1976. 237  Observations on the Indexation of  Old Age Pensions 
Act 
137.77% of  first $110 plus 50.10% of  next  $290 plus 46.82% of  next  $150 plus 
55.05% of next $100 plus 30.61% of  next $100 plus 25.51% of  next $250 plus 
22.98% of next $175 plus 21.28% of next $100. EffectiveforJune 1976,  increase of 
6.4% in benefit level. Plus 20% of  next $100, effective for January 1977. 
145.90% of  first $110 plus 53.06% of  next $290 plus 49.58% of  next  $150 plus 
58.30% of  next $100 plus 32.42% of  next $100 plus 27.02% of  next $250 plus 
24.34% of  next $175 plus 22.54% of next $100 plus 21.18% of next $100. Effective 
for June 1977,  increase of 5.9% in benefit level. Plus 20% of next $100, effective 
for January 1978. 
155.38% of  first $110 plus 56.51% of  next  $290 plus 52.81% of  next $150 plus 
62.09% of  next $100 plus 34.53% of  next $100 plus 28.78% of  next $250 plus 
25.92% of  next $175 plus 24.01% of  next $100 plus 22.56% of  next $100 plus 
21.30% of next $100. Effecrivefor June 1978,  increase of  6.5% in benefit level. 
For workers who attain age 62, become disabled, or die before 1979: formula same 
as preceding formula plus 20% of  next $435, effective for January 1979. 
170.76% of  first $110 plus 62.01%  of  next $290 plus 58.04% of  next  $150 plus 
68.2470 of  next $100 plus 37.95% of  next $100 plus 31.63% of  next $250 plus 
28.49% of  next $175 plus 26.39% of  next $100 plus 24.79% of  next $100 plus 
23.41% ofnext $100plus21.98% ofnext$435.  EffectiveforJune1979,increaseof 
9.9% in benefit level. Plus 20% of  next $250, effectivefor January 1980. 
195.18% of  first $110 plus 70.98% of  next  $290 plus 66.34% of  next $150 plus 
78.00% of  next $100 plus 43.38% of  next $100 plus 36.15% of  next $250 plus 
32.56% of  next $175 plus 30.16% of next $100 plus 28.33% of next $100 plus 
26.76% of next $100 plus 25.12% of next $435 plus 22.86% of next $250. Effective 
forJune  1980,  increase of 14.3% in benefit level. Plus 20% of next $315, effective 
for January 1981. 
217.04% of first $110 plus 78.93%  of  next  $290 plus 73.77% of  next  $150 plus 
86.74% of next $100 plus 48.24% of  next $100 plus 40.20% of  next $250 plus 
36.21% ofnext $175plus33.54% ofnext $100plus31.50% ofnext $lOOplus29.76 
of next $100 plus 27.93% of next $435 plus 25.42% of  next $250 plus 22.24% of 
next $315. Effective for June 1981,  increase of  11.2% in benefit level. 
1977 
JFnmulb q-ptiis  10  .GJ.kfF,l 
For workers who attain age 62, become disabled, or die in 1979: 90% of first $180 
plus 32% of next $905 plus 15% of excess over $1,085. Effective  forJanuary 1979. 
(Provision for future automatic increases in bend points, $180 and $1,085, and for 
future automatic "cost-of-living" increases after eligibility for benefits.) Effective 
for  June 1979,  increase of 9.9% in benefit level. Effectivefor  June 1980,  increase 
of  14.3% in benefit level. Effectivefor June 1981,  increase of  11.2% in benefit 
level. 
For  workers  attaining age 62  in  1979-83  and  applying for old-age retirement 
1977 
benefits of  dying in or after 
Source:  Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Suppement, 1980. 238  Lawrence H. Summers 
interest  rate r, in  equation (2), the reduction  in  lifetime risk  due to 
indexing is clearly negligible. Some data on the financial position of the 
elderly are presented below. They show that most possess at least a small 
amount of liquid assets. That is all that would be necessary to buffer any 
fluctuations in real income due to unexpected changes in the price level. 
Even for individuals with no access to the capital market, there is some 
margin for intertemporal substitution in the timing of  the purchases of 
durable goods. It thus seems unlikely that the length of the adjustment 
period constitutes any significant argument for indexation. The data in 
table 9.2  certainly suggest  that  there  has  been  no  reduction  in  the 
variance in real benefit levels in the post-1972 period when social security 
was indexed. Admittedly this evidence is difficult to interpret, because 
there has been an upward drift in benefit levels. 
9.1.2  Indexation as Precommitment 
None of the preceding discussion suggests any large effect of  a policy of 
indexed benefits. Yet the issue seems to be viewed passionately by many 
interest groups. One plausible explanation of  how indexation can have 
important effects comes from viewing it as a form of  precommitment. 
The government is committed because of political constraints to maintain 
the level of  benefits,  however they  are denominated. If  benefits  are 
indexed, they cannot be cut in real terms. If not indexed, they cannot be 
cut in nominal terms. This distinction is frequently cited in discussions of 
tax bracket indexing as well as social security indexing. It may be the 
result of  any political process in which it is difficult to enact legislation 
because more than a majority is required, or because it is hard to build a 
consensus among diverse constituencies. In this situation, it is possible to 
reduce real benefit levels through inflation erosion and inaction but not 
through actual legislation. Thus the main effect of  indexation may be 
precommitment to a minimum fixed real benefit level. 
At  first it may seem as  if such a policy should be favored by advocates of 
a larger social security system. Indexation does prevent reductions in real 
benefit levels through inflation. On reflection, however, the situation is 
more complex.  The optimum level  of  real  benefits  legislated will  in 
general  be lower if  a constraint is imposed precluding  future benefit 
reductions. The nature of  the ambiguity can be highlighted in the context 
of a highly stylized model. 
Suppose that optimum level of  benefits in period t is given by X,  where 
X, is distributed uniformly on the unit interval and is serially uncorre- 
lated. Assume also that the regret associated with setting a benefit level 
B, in period t is given by 
(4)  R(B,X)=X- B  if  BSX 
=a(B-X) if  brX. 239  Observations on the Indexation of  Old Age Pensions 
Table 9.2  Ratios of Primary Benefit for Man Retiring at Age 65 
at Beginning of Various Years to Earnings 
in Year before Retirement (%) 
Low-Earnings  Average-Earnings  Maximum-Earnings 

















































































































Source:  Robert J. Myers, “Summary of  the Provisions of  the Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance System, the Hospital Insurance System, and the Supplemental  Medical 
Insurance System” (unpublished manuscript, Temple University, June 1980). 
Note:  Earnings record for average-earnings individual is the annualized average wage for 
all workers in the first quarter of  the particular years. Earnings record for low-earnings 
individual is $3,200 for 1974; for other years, it is the same ratio to the earnings of  the 
average-earnings individual as prevailed in 1974 (namely, 39.8%). Ratios for the average- 
earnings individual are lower than for the maximum-earnings one in 1963-66  result because 
the maximum taxable earnings base remained unchanged in 1959-65.  Thus the average 
earner had almost the same “final” earnings as the maximum earner but had significantly 
lower “career” earnings. 240  Lawrence H. Summers 
Let  policymakers  design  the social  security  scheme  to minimize  the 
present value of future regrets. That is, they choose a sequence of values 
B,  in each period to minimke 
z 
(5)  L = ECR(B, -  X)f3‘”f). 
I 
In the case where there is  no precommitment problem,  the optimal 
strategy is clearly to set B,  = X,  in each period and have zero regret. Note 
that when this strategy is followed, thc mean level of benefits is 2  = 0.5. 
Now consider the optimal strategy when benefits can never be cut. It is 
immediately obvious that it will never be desirable to set B, >  X,. How- 
ever, it may be desirable to set B, <  X,. This may be seen a5 follows. Let 
L(B) be the expected regret if the optimal strategy is pursued, given that 
benefits are constrained to be greater than B in all remaining periods. It 
follows immediately  that if  X,  5 B,,  then the optimal strategy is to set 
B, = X, or to satisfy the first-order condition, 
1-p(%)  =0, 
B=B, 
if the value of B, satisfying this first-order condition is less than X,.  The 
first-order  condition  (6) states that the marginal gain from  increasing 
benefits in the current period must equal the marginal cost from imposing 
tighter constraints in future periods. The first-order  condition (6) does 
not provide a basis for computing the optimum level of B,, since the form 
of the function L(B) is unknown. 
However, it is possible to characterize the stochastic steady state when 
the  optimal strategy  is  pursued.  This  may  be  done  as  follows.  The 
optimum feasible  strategy  at time  s  is  given  by  some function  B,  = 
f(B,,X,), which  is clearly  monotone increasing  in X,. The maximum 
attainable value of X,  will be given by f(B,, l),  which as shown below 
does not depend on B. It is clear that ultimately the value of B, must ap- 
proach this limit. The steady state may then be characterized by solving 
forf(B, 1). 
Equation (6) reveals that the optimum choice of B*  does not depend on 
B. It can be solved easily in this case. Suppose f(B, 1) = B*.  Then in all 
future periods  B = B*. If  X<  B*, the “no-cut  constraint” ensures this 
equality. If X>B‘,  the equality is ensured by the monotonicity of  the 
functionf(B,X). This means that it is easy to evaluatef(B*). It is given by 
(7) 
Differentiating  (7) and using (6) yields the first-order condition 
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It follows that B* is given by 
(9) 
Several inferences can be drawn from equation (9). Note first that the 
steady-state level of benefits B* can be greater or less than the expected 
benefit level when full discretion is maintained. By choosing appropriate 
parameter values in (9), any level of B may be found to be optimal.  As  the 
value of the discount factor p increases, the level of  benefit declines. This 
is because when the future counts more highly the cost of constraining 
one’s policy choices is more severe. As one  would expect, increases in the 
value of a also reduce the steady-state value of B. 
The stylized model here illustrates an obvious principle that cutting off 
one’s options is undesirable,  and  a more subtle one that imposing a 
“no-cut’’ constraint on a program may reduce its expected funding level. 
Obviously, the model would accommodate a number of extensions. But it 
seems unlikely that these qualitative results would be upset by introduc- 
ing factors such as an upward drift in the expected desired level of  funding 
X, or allowing it to be serially correlated. 
It is difficult to assess the relevance of the effects stressed here. Cer- 
tainly the current policy debate on social security makes it plausible that 
the program would be cut in real terms, if  this were possible without 
legislative action. This suggests the importance of  the precommitment 
aspect of  indexation stressed here. The failure of  Congress to rescind 
double indexing’s effects strongly supports  the importance of precommit- 
ment effects. Whether or not no-cut commitments have the restraining 
effects on spending suggested here is more problematic. 
9.2  Inflation Indexation and Private Pensions 
There are at least two important indexation issues in connection with 
defined-benefit private pensions. First there is the question of  indexing 
benefits for persons who are already retired. At the present time, most 
private pensions in  the United States provide beneficiaries with  level 
nominal annuities. While adjustments  are sometimes made for the effects 
of  inflation, these are rare and relatively small. A second issue is in the 
calculation of benefits. At present, in most plans, workers’ vested ben- 
efits are a fraction which depends on years of  service and their current 
salaries. Actual benefits received from a firm depend on a worker’s final 
year salary at that firm. These two aspects of  pension indexation are 
considered separately below. 
9.2.1  Indexed Retirement Benefits 
It is widely believed that private pensions should offer indexed retire- 
ment benefits.  For example, the President’s  Commission on Pension 242  Lawrence H. Summers 
Policy (1980) “encourages private and state and local pension plans to 
provide some form of inflation protection for retirees.” The failure of 
private pensions to offer indexed options is a puzzle. Feldstein  (1981) 
suggests that the development of indexed pensions would not have been 
desirable because workers already had a substantial degree of inflation 
protection  from social security. His analysis  assumes that the capital 
market compensates individuals for bearing inflation risk. The basis for 
this supposition is not at all clear. Both the issuers and holders of nominal 
instruments  bear risk  from inflation uncertainty.  There is no obvious 
reason why the holders rather than issuers of nominal instruments should 
be compensated for bearing this risk. Indeed, the fact that mean realized 
returns on bonds and bills have been essentially zero over the last 50 years 
tends to suggest that the capital market does not compensate individuals 
for bearing inflation risk. 
At the outset, it is useful to consider as a benchmark the special case of 
a perfect capital market, in the presence of  a safe real asset, and unchang- 
ing opportunity sets for investors. In this case all individuals in equilib- 
rium will hold some combination of  the safe asset and the market port- 
folio.  There is no optimal  degree of  pension  indexing;  any form  of 
pension asset is as good as any other. If a firm issues safe real pensions, it 
will find that its shareholders hedge by  purchasing  the safe asset. Its 
pension beneficiaries  draw down their  holdings of  the safe asset  and 
switch their portfolios toward more risky assets. The form of the pension 
benefit is a matter of  irrelevance. This theorem can clearly be proven 
under much more general assumptions, similar to those that have been 
used to provide proofs of the generalized Modigliani-Miller theorems. In 
order to find  any  effects of  alternative  indexing  arrangements, it  is 
necessary to introduce some capital market imperfections. 
The natural imperfection to introduce is a restriction on short sales. 
This has  at least  two potentially  important  effects.  First,  it  may  be 
impossible for individuals to undo the effects of  their pension plan. In 
general, this would require drawing down or selling short their assets held 
by their pension funds. This consideration, taken by itself, would tend to 
suggest that efficient private pension arrangements would make benefit 
levels contingent  on the returns on widely  traded assets.  Second, in 
general it will be impossible for all individuals to hold the market port- 
folio. Because of  moral hazards, individuals are likely to be locked into 
holding much more of their wealth in the form of their own homes and 
human capital than would be included in fully diversified portfolios. This 
suggests that they would prefer their pension assets to have returns that 
are negatively correlated with the returns on assets that they are locked 
into holding. 
Hurd and Shoven (this volume) assess the vulnerability of the portfolio 
of assets held by the elderly to  the effects of inflation. They conclude that 
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well hedged against unexpected inflation. It is  likely that their results 
understate the extent to which the aged are protected from inflation. A 
very sizable fraction of the wealth of the aged is represented by the gross 
value  of  their  homes. Both economic theory  and  empirical  evidence 
(Poterba 1981 ; Summers 1981~)  suggest that owner-occupied  housing 
prices  should  rise  much  more than  point  for  point  with  unexpected 
inflation. This inference is supported by the recent sharp decline in real 
house prices. 
These factors suggest that nominal pension liabilities may in fact re- 
duce the real uncertainties  associated with  the wealth position  of  the 
aged. Of  course, efficient  pension  arrangement cannot  be  discussed 
without also considering the risks borne by corporate shareholders. This 
aspect of the problem is considered below, after a discussion of the role of 
indexation in vesting provisions. 
9.2.2  Indexed Vesting Provisions 
Bulow (1982) has made the important observation that in a competitive 
labor market a worker’s marginal product in each period should equal the 
sum of his wage and his accrual of vested pension benefits. More gener- 
ally, his argument suggests that some set of market forces determine an 
optimal time path for compensation.  This optimal compensation path will 
in general be independent of  what pension arrangements are made. If 
pension benefits are vested in nominal terms, they represent a nominal 
asset to workers and nominal liability to firms. If the rate of inflation rises, 
the value of the worker’s already accrued pension asset declines. There is 
no reason why this should be associated with higher subsequent com- 
pensation any more than one would expect workers’ compensation to be 
increased just because other parts of their portfolio performed badly. 
The common argument that pensions are effectively indexed during 
the accrual  phase, because  benefits  are tied  to final year  salaries, is 
wrong, as Bulow (1982) points out. It ignores the fact that wages and 
pension accruals are determined jointly. Market forces determine a path 
of  total  compensation  not  a path  of  wages. If  inflation increases and 
pension rules remain static, so that the rate of growth of pension accruals 
increases, the rate of  wage growth will decline. 
Thus, under current institutional arrangements pension wealth is a 
nominal asset for all workers, not just those who have already retired. At 
current high rates of  interest, the value of the asset is likely to be small for 
most  young  workers.  As just  emphasized,  we  should not  expect  the 
nonindexation of vested benefits to have any effect on the path of com- 
pensation. Hence there is no reason to expect that indexing pensions 
would  have  any  effects  on  patterns of  labor  turnover  or allocative 
efficiency. Again by the same arguments  made above, in a perfect capital 
market indexation would have no real effects. 
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Table 9.3  Composition of  Wealth by Age Group, December 31, 1962 
(Percentage Distribution of  Dollar Aggregates) 
Age of  Head (Years) 
35-  45-  55-  65 and 
Form of  Wealth  44  54  64  Over 
Net home  31  33  25  22 
Automobile  5  4  2  1 
Business  23  23  20  12 
Liquid assets  10  11  13  16 
Investment assets  22  26  38  47 
Miscellaneous assets  9  3  2  1 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Source:  Dorothy S.  Projector and Gertrude S.  Weiss, 1966 Survey of  Financial Characteris- 
lics of  Consumers (Washington, D.C.:  Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
August 1966). 
groups. The data suggest that the younger part of the population is likely 
to be even better hedged against inflation than the aged. This inference is 
strengthened by the observation that the “net home” item in table 9.3 is 
likely to involve much more offsetting gross home value and mortgage 
debt for younger households. This implies that the provision of nominal 
pensions is unlikely to impose serious risks on young workers. 
9.2.3  Risk Bearing by Firms 
The question which remains to be examined is the impact of alternative 
pension indexing arrangements  on the risks borne by the ultimate owners 
of pension liabilities. The proximate owners are corporation. The ulti- 
mate owners are mainly corporate shareowners, but also other corporate 
creditors, and taxpayers through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo- 
ration. Given capital market imperfections, it is reasonable to expect that 
corporate shareowners  will be less well hedged against inflation than will 
pension  beneficiaries.  Data  in  Blume, Crockett,  and  Friend  (1974) 
confirm that ownership of corporate stock is concentrated among the very 
affluent.  Hurd and Shoven (this volume) report that inflation vulnerabil- 
ity increases with affluence. This inference is strongly confirmed by the 
data in table 9.4 on the composition of wealth by income class. The share 
of liquid assets and investment assets (mainly stocks and bonds) rises 
sharply with income. 
The same point  may  be made more directly.  Despite the fact  that 
pension liabilities are nominal, corporate equity returns are systemati- 
cally negatively related to unexpected inflation.  In Summers (1981b) I 
show that this is quite consistent with rationality on the part of investors. 
A 1% increase in the permanent rate of  expected inflation is estimated to Table 9.4  Composition of Wealth for Different Income Classes 
(Mean Amount of  Equity in Specified Assets for All Units in  Group) 
Portfolio of 
Liquid and Investment Assets 
Business, 
Profession  Invest-  Miscel- 
Total  Own  Auto-  (Farm and  Liquid  ment  laneous 
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reduce the present value of  real cash flows to shareholders by 3.46% due 
to tax effects. This calculation  does not take any account of  pension 
obligations. Since in most cases pension plans are overfunded, taking 
account of  pension assets and liabilities would increase the estimated 
negative effect of inflation. If  firms offered indexed pensions, the nega- 
tive effect would be increased still further. 
The discussion in this section suggests that the failure of  the private 
market to develop  inflation-indexed  pensions  is not  surprising.  In  a 
perfect  capital market, indexation  arrangements would  have  no  real 
effects. If capital markets are imperfect, one would expect arrangements 
to evolve which lead to  the sharing of otherwise undiversifiable risks. The 
holders of  pension assets appear to be positioned so that they gain from 
unexpected  inflation.  The corporations which issue pension  liabilities 
appear, because of  a nonindexed tax system, to be in the position  of 
nominal creditors.  This means that efficient  risk  sharing calls for the 
issuance of nominal pension liabilities. It is interesting to note that similar 
considerations can explain why indexed bonds have not been issued. 
9.3  Indexing to Other Aggregates 
Almost all practically oriented discussions of indexation focus on in- 
dexing benefits to the general price level. The motivation for this choice is 
rarely clearly specified. The implicit argument for price-level indexation 
seems to be that this provides full insurance because real benefit levels are 
guaranteed. To state this argument is to realize its limitations. Presum- 
ably, we care about the real  standard of  living of  pension  and social 
security beneficiaries, rather than their benefit levels from the programs. 
Only for individuals wholly supported by a given nonadjustable program 
is there a potential argument for inflation indexation of  benefit levels. 
The discussion in the preceding section made the point that insuring 
program benefit levels may  actually increase  the risk  borne by  bene- 
ficiaries if  benefits would otherwise have covaried negatively with the 
assets in beneficiaries’ portfolios. 
This raises the more general point that if the goal is to provide insur- 
ance to beneficiaries, it will in general be desirable to link changes in 
benefits to changes in the opportunity set faced by consumers. Benefits 
should be varied so as to play the role of  the hedge portfolios in Merton’s 
(1973) intertemporal  capital asset pricing model. Of course, the qualifica- 
tions suggested in preceding sections about whether indexing can have 
any real effects apply equally in this context. Similarly, the cost of any 
insurance is that the insured risks are foisted onto the holders of pension 
liabilities. 
These points may be illustrated in a more formal way. Consider the 
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that the horizon is known with certainty and that future prices are known 
with  certainty, so that there exists a safe real asset. The consumer’s 
problem is to 
(10)  maxJ U(C,)e-’(’-‘)ds  s.t. A, + JB,e-’(”-‘)ds 
T  T 
t  f 
T 
= J” P, C, e -  i(s -  ‘)ds, 
f 
where A represents assets, B represents benefits, and i is the nominal 
interest rate. This problem gives rise to an indirect utility function of the 
form 
(11)  U = V(A,,  i, P,, . . . ,PT,  B,,  . . . ,  BT). 
It  is  not  difficult  to verify  that  the  indirect  utility  function  (11) is 
homogeneous of degree 0 in A and the vectors P and B.  If for simplicity it 
is assumed that the rate of inflation is constant, (11) can be rewritten as 
(12) 
where IT  is the rate of inflation and the lower-case values of  B represent 
real benefit levels. It is immediately apparent from (12) that changes in 
the rate of  inflation will not affect the attainable level of utility only if, 
first, they do not affect real benefit levels, B,; second, they leave the real 
interest rate, it -  rt,  unaffected; and, third, they have no effect on real 
wealth. Conventional indexing schemes are directed at ensuring that the 
first of these conditions is met. In the preceding section I considered the 
implications of the fact that the third condition is unlikely to be satisfied. 
The analysis here, however, suggests that, if it is to ensure beneficiaries’ 
standard of  living,  indexing must  take account  of  all changes in  real 
wealth and in the real interest rate. 
The effect of changes in the real interest rate is of particular interest. 
Conventional price indexes try to measure the change from period to 
period in the cost of attaining some level of utility. Normally this is done 
by finding the change in the purchase price of  a fixed bundle of goods. The 
logic of  this procedure is not clear once one recognizes that consumers 
“spend” most of their income on future consumption. If  the price of a 
washing machine goes down, a consumer is usually thought better off. 
Has  he not also gained if the price in terms of today’s dollars of the bundle 
he plans to buy next period goes down? This suggests that in evaluating 
the welfare of the aged some sort of intertemporal price index should be 
employed. 
There is another way of looking at the problem which leads to a similar 
conclusion. Consider an individual who desires a constant real consump- 
tion stream and holds all his wealth in the form of an indexed real annuity. 
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exactly match his consumption stream. However, if real interest rates 
fluctuate, the market value of such a real annuity will vary. The asset will 
appear risky when risk is measurable in the standard way. This paradox is 
easily resolved. When real interest rates rise, the value of  the annuity 
declines and so does the price of  future consumption. The value of the 
annuity measured relative to a proper intertemporal cost-of-living index 
(as  described  below)  remains  constant.  The same analysis  could  be 
applied  to the situation  of  an individual who  owns his  home, which 
fluctuates in value as the real interest rate changes. 
Pollak (1975) shows how the standard theory of cost-of-living indexes 
can be extended to the intertemporal case. My goal here is more modest. 
In an effort to illustrate the potential importance of  changes in the real 
interest rate, I calculate alternative estimates of a Laspyres intertemporal 
cost-of-living index. The assumed market basket is a constant stream of 
real consumption over a 10-year period. The purchase price of  such a real 
annuity is given by 
P,(1 - PT) 
P*  =  , 
rt 
where r, is the real interest rate at time rand T is the annuity horizon. The 
change in the intertemporal cost-of-living index is given by 
(1 - PT) 
%A  PA = %A Pt + %A 
r, 
The first term in  (14) corresponds to the ordinary inflation  rate. The 
second corresponds to the change in the price of future consumption. 
The  major problem in estimating the intertemporal  price index given in 
(13) is measuring the long-term real interest rate. In the empirical work 
reported below, the actual ex post rates of inflation were used in calculat- 
ing the long-term real interest rate. For periods after 1981, when actual 
inflation data were unavailable, expected inflation  as measured in the 
Livingston survey was used. These data are described in Carlson (1977). 
Obviously, the use of such a perfect foresight inflation measure is some- 
what problematic. Preliminary investigations using the econometric mea- 
sures of expected inflation developed in Summers (19810) reached qual- 
itatively similar conclusions. 
Estimates of the percentage change in the intertemporal cost-of-living 
index are shown in table 9.5 along with the rate of CPI inflation. It is clear 
that movements in real interest rates are an important element affecting 
the intertemporal index. In the 3 years when CPI inflation was greatest, 
1974, 1978, and 1979, the intertemporal index showed only very small 
increases. This was  because  the sharp increases in  real  interest  rates 
reduced the price of future consumption. Increasing real interest rates 
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Table 9.5  Alternative Cost-of-Living Indexes 
%ACPI  % AP, 
1953  0.637  -0.151 
1954  -0.501  1.424 
1955  0.359  0.357 
1956  2.862  1.977 
1957  3.019  1.076 
1958  1.771  3.672 
1959  1.508  0.110 
1960  1.478  3.628 
1961  0.671  3.034 
1962  1.215  1.982 
1963  1.661  5.215 
1964  1.216  5.645 
1965  1.935  4.318 
1966  3.348  1.759 
1967  3.041  3.768 
1968  4.718  4.172 
1969  6.103  5.383 
1970  5.482  6.114 
1971  3.365  10.112 
1972  3.423  6.433 
1973  8.775  2.656 
1974  12.200  5.105 
1975  7.013  5.399 
1976  4.822  7.604 
1977  6.769  8.255 
1978  9.032  4.278 
1979  13.319  6.638 
Nore:  Calculations described in  text. Yearly  values were  calculated on  a December- 
December basis. 
intertemporal inflation rate. Overall, the correlation between the rate of 
inflation as measured using the standard CPI and as measured using the 
intertemporal index was only .45.  These crude calculations indicate the 
importance  of  aggregate factors other than the price level which may 
affect consumers’ well-being. 
It is important to  be clear about the legitimate uses of an intertemporal 
price index like the one developed here. The index provides a correct 
basis for assessing the change in welfare for a given change in prices and 
interest rates for an individual who has no future income streams. Even 
here there is a small problem unless individuals are infinite lived, since 
the length of  their horizon is changing. The more serious issue involves 
future incomes. It would be appropriate to compare the present value of 
future incomes to the price index developed here. It should be clear that 250  Lawrence H. Summers 
in such a calculation the effects of  a change in the interest rate on the 
present value of future streams and on the price of  future consumption 
would work in opposite directions. The adjustments  under consideration 
will  be important only when  the duration of  the individual’s  future 
consumption and income streams differ significantly. The data in Hurd 
and Shoven (this volume) suggest that only about half of the wealth of the 
“young aged” is in the form of  future streams of income. This suggests 
that the price  index  considered here is likely  to be very  relevant  to 
assessing their well-being. 
Once one contemplates the possibility of  indexing benefits to a price 
index of this general type, other possibilities suggest themselves. Why not 
also  index  benefits  to changes in  real  wealth  which  also change  the 
opportunity set, or to developments which affect future income? Efforts 
to integrate private pensions and social security represent one small step 
in  this  direction.  Such indexing  schemes  involve  the same issues  of 
discretion and capital market behavior. It does seem clear, however, that 
there is no strong logic which  supports indexation of  benefits to the 
current price level as against other alternatives. 
A second implication of  these results is that in making portfolio choices 
the aged should be concerned about real returns relative to an intertem- 
poral price index like that considered here. Assets should be more highly 
valued if their returns are positively correlated with the price of  future 
consumption.  I plan to  address this issue in more  detail in future research. 
9.4  Conclusions 
The analysis in this chapter supports  three principal conclusions. First, 
indexation of both public and private pensions is likely to have only minor 
effects on real economic behavior. The presence of provisions for discre- 
tionary  adjustment and the workings of  capital  markets suggest  that 
indexation  provisions  will  be  largely  neutralized  by  other  offsetting 
adjustments. 
Second, the effects of increased indexation may well be perverse. The 
precommitment aspect of public indexing means that the ultimate effect 
of indexing provisions may be to reduce the size of public pensions. The 
nonindexation of private pensions probably represents efficient risk shar- 
ing. It appears that pension beneficiaries are much better hedged against 
inflation risks than are the bearers of pension liabilities. 
Third, if insurance is the motivation for indexation provisions, there is 
no reason  why such provisions  should be confined to inflation.  Only 
under very restrictive  assumptions will  inflation  indexing provide full 
insurance. In particular, an important source of exogenous uncertainty 
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estimated intertemporal cost-of-living index diverge significantly from 
those in the conventional CPI. 
In his contribution to this volume, Robert Merton advocates a novel 
solution to some of the problems discussed here. He proposes that social 
security benefits be indexed to the level of aggregate consumption. He 
argues that, in  addition to providing inflation  protection, such a plan 
would offer a form of “standard of  living” insurance. In general, the level 
of  consumption is likely to be a proxy  for the opportunity set facing 
consumers.  This  notion  is  justified  formally  in  Merton  (1973)  and 
Breeden (1979). 
Merton’s proposed social security plan is self-financing and requires 
only very infrequent adjustment. The self-financing character of the plan 
reduces substantially the precommitment problems stressed here. Mer- 
ton’s indexing scheme provides for both increases and decreases in ben- 
efit levels, so the “no-cut’’ constraint is unlikely to bind. It also implicitly 
makes benefit levels depend on both the level of wealth and real rates of 
return. 
There are, however, a number of types of shocks which are likely to 
affect real consumption  but not optimal benefit levels. These include 
changes in the taste for leisure, changes in demographic composition of 
the population, changes in life expectancy, and changes in the distribu- 
tion of income. The importance of  these shocks relative to others causing 
fluctuations in aggregate consumption is an empirical question. If  they 
are significant, it may be preferable to design indexes based on estimated 
changes in the opportunity set of the representative aged consumer. The 
intertemporal cost-of-living index presented here represents a start in this 
direction. 
Notes 
1.  Indexing in the design of the benefit formula may well cause greater horizontal equity. 
2. Though the discussion here focuses on social security, it is clearly applicable to other 
3. This condition is necessary. In order to talk meaningfully about the effects of  indexa- 
public pensions such as those for veterans and federal employees. 
tion it must be assumed that benefit packages have equal value in all cases. 252  Lawrence H. Summers 
Comment  John Bossons 
The debate about whether indexed pensions could add significantly to the 
welfare of individuals is difficult to resolve. With respect to the indexing 
of private pension benefits, the obvious question for an economist to ask 
is, “If their potential benefits are considerable, why do they not already 
exist?” The obvious answer pointing to innovation costs and externalities 
is not really an answer; it is necessary to show both that such costs are 
substantial and that they outweigh potential benefits to the private in- 
novator. The fact  that the creation  of  an entire set  of  new  financial 
markets would be required to permit intermediation by financial institu- 
tions implies a potential for externalities which can leave a substantial gap 
between  social  benefits  and  the benefits which  can  accrue to private 
innovators.  Nevertheless,  the possible  existence  of  such externalities 
merely  points  out a  way  to rationalize  the  nonexistence  of  indexed 
financial instruments. 
Summers argues that such rationalizations are irrelevant because the 
potential benefits are in fact small for the entire set of individuals partici- 
pating in private pension plans. While I disagree with his conclusion, he 
correctly emphasizes the necessity of  differentiating between mere redis- 
tributions of  risk and contracting innovations which reduce nondiversi- 
fiable  risks  for  participants  in  both sides  of  a  financial  market. His 
argument rests on three empirical propositions: 
1. Indexation is “merely” a repackaging of  risk. 
2.  Capital markets are sufficiently perfect  and  complete that most 
individuals can undo whatever portfolio decisions are made by pension 
plans, so that generalizations of  the Modigliani-Miller theorem can be 
invoked. 
3.  The composition of nonpension wealth for pensioners and share- 
holders is such that nominal pensions are if  anything negatively corre- 
lated in real terms with the return on nonpension wealth for both pen- 
sioners and shareholders. 
The last empirical point is in turn based on several empirical “facts”: (a) 
the results reported by Hurd and Shoven, in their chapter in this volume, 
on the “relatively high” extent to which elderly persons are protected 
from inflation; (6) an observed positive correlation with inflation of  real 
returns on assets into which market constraints (transactions costs) are 
likely to “lock in” individuals; and (c)  an observed negative correlation 
with inflation of real returns on shares. Given these empirical “facts” and 
a focus on single-period  portfolio optimization,  it is no surprise that 
indexed private pensions do not exist; the same arguments  may be used to 
rationalize the fact that corporations  do not  issue  indexed  bonds. In 
John Bossons is professor of  economics at the Institute for Policy Analysis, University of 
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either case, if  Summers’s arguments were correct, there could be some 
small social benefit (at least for some market participants) in establishing 
markets in indexed financial instruments, but these benefits would be 
unlikely to outweigh the costs of creating the markets. 
I do not agree with this conclusion, and want to emphasize the impor- 
tance of  several factors which Summers ignores in this chapter. Both the 
empirical  “facts”  and  their  implications  need to be  examined  more 
carefully. As with many second-best questions in policy analysis, one’s 
conclusions depend critically on what constraints are taken as given. 
The first point I want to make is that the observed correlations of real 
returns with inflation may be largely due to  the distortions introduced by 
the lack of  indexation in the tax system. The magnitude of these distor- 
tions is well known,  in part due to work by  Feldstein  and Summers.’ 
Assuming a positive correlation of expected and actual inflation rates, 
these distortions introduce negative  correlation with inflation for real 
after-tax income to shareholders and positive correlation with inflation 
for the real after-tax return on owner-occupied housing. If the tax system 
were completely indexed, these tax sources of correlation between real 
returns and inflation would disappear. It is of course possible to argue, as 
Summers  does, that the observed failure of the private market to develop 
indexed pensions  and/or to issue indexed bonds may be the result of 
observable correlations between asset returns and inflation. However, to 
the extent that these are the result of  nonneutralities in the tax system, 
the “efficiency” of nonindexed pensions in the current context is only a 
second-best  form  of  efficiency.  The observed  private  nonissuance  of 
indexed bonds may be one of the important social costs of  the failure to 
correct the definition of taxable income for errors  introduced by inflation. 
While it may be second best to stay with nonindexed private pensions 
given a nonindexed tax system, I would rather interpret this conclusion as 
yet another argument for tax indexation. 
My second point is that an ability of the average retired individual to 
invest in a portfolio that is relatively well hedged against inflation does 
not imply that there are no potential social benefits from the introduction 
of indexed pensions. Hurd and Shoven’s results imply that there is no 
pressing inflation-induced  redistribution  away from the elderly in the 
aggregate which might “require” indexed pensions (or new government 
transfer programs) to offset such a redistribution. But to conclude that 
this implies no potential social benefits from indexed pensions misses the 
point. Here I want to  argue two propositions. First (and less important), I 
would argue that the portfolio reallocations reported in the Hurd-Shoven 
chapter (in particular, from stocks and long-term bonds to liquid assets) 
reflect the results of a welfare-reducing change in investment opportuni- 
ties resulting from the nonexistence  of  a market in indexed long-term 
bonds. Second, the most important missing market is a market in indexed 
annuities. As Summers  emphasizes, it is relatively easy for individuals to 254  Lawrence H. Summers 
modify their asset and debt portfolios in order to “undo” pension port- 
folio decisions. It is much more difficult for individuals to combine an 
optimal portfolio with differing desires for bequests. 
The most important potential social gain  from the introduction  of 
indexed bonds and pensions is that they make possible the development 
of  a private market in indexed annuities. The nonexistence of  such a 
market requires households to save more than they otherwise would, in 
order to insure against the risk of living longer than expected. While the 
extent of the aggregate welfare loss resulting from this market failure may 
be reduced by the offsetting effects on personal savings of tax distortions 
that reduce the return on savings, it is still true that the distributional 
effects of the market failure may be substantial. Even taking into account 
offsetting tax distortions that at least partly neutralize impacts on aggre- 
gate saving, the nonexistence of  a market in indexed annuities may have a 
substantial welfare cost. 
With incomplete capital markets, the “benchmark” case of a perfect 
capital market with a safe real asset has little relevance for the policy 
questions that are at issue. It is of course obvious that in such a bench- 
mark case there is no social benefit from any degree of pension indexing. 
The problem with putting much stress on this benchmark is that no safe 
real asset exists. Moreover, the essence of the lifetime planning problem 
is its multiperiod nature, with an uncertain planning horizon. Analyzing 
this problem using one-period portfolio models ignores the importance of 
the insurance components of  the capital markets. 
Having said this, I must return to the obvious question cited at the 
beginning of  my comment. If  the benefits from indexed  annuities are 
potentially significant, why haven’t they been created by  the market? 
One possible answer is that markets in indexed bonds over a spectrum of 
maturities need to be created in order for insurance companies to be able 
to offer  indexed  annuities  efficiently;  the innovation  costs  in  simul- 
taneously establishing an entire set of  markets are obviously nontrivial. 
An alternative answer is that, on the margin, the market is innovating in 
this respect by starting to offer variable annuities. However, even this 
innovation is costly, in part because of the number of dimensions along 
which market demand seems to be differentiated. These dimensions (tilt, 
combination with put and call options reflected in floors and ceilings, 
etc.) are partly discussed in Bodie and Pesando’s contribution  to this 
volume. I will not pursue them here, other than to note that this multi- 
dimensionality  makes market research and annuity design harder and 
hence raises innovation costs. 
To summarize, I am arguing that to call indexation merely a repackag- 
ing of risk is to  miss the real potential benefit of indexation. Repackaging 
is an appropriate way of  characterizing the question of  the effects of 
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for indexed bonds. However, if indexed bonds are introduced along with 
indexed pensions, the situation is changed in two respects. First, a safe 
real long-term asset would be provided for investors (such as pension 
funds) whose preferred habitat is long term. No such asset now exists.2 
Second, the ability to obtain indexed annuities would permit households 
to insure  against  the risk  of  living longer than expected. These two 
institutional changes would  entirely change the attainable  risk-return 
trade-offs faced by households and their private intermediaries. 
Up to this point, I have focused my comments on Summers’s conclu- 
sions regarding the indexation of private pensions, both because of the 
importance of the problem and because the issues raised lie behind other 
questions dealt with in his chapter. I turn now to the questions of the 
index to be used and of  the indexing of  public pensions. 
The choice of  index is an important issue, though of secondary impor- 
tance relative to whether any private indexed annuities are offered. It is 
worth  noting that three quite different bases for indexing have been 
suggested  by  the various  contributors to this  volume:  (1) a  general 
consumer price index (the conventional alternative);  (2) a price index for 
domestic product (i,e., a consumer price index corrected to exclude the 
effects of  changes in the terms of  trade); and (3) an index of  per capita 
consumption (the Merton proposal). The first two are more similar to 
each other than either is to the third. 
Summers makes  a  number of  interesting  points  in  supporting  the 
Merton proposal. I want simply to note that there are a number of sources 
of changes in per capita consumption, some of which would clearly result 
in redistribution across generations. For example, a change of taste with 
respect to leisureilabor choice in the existing working generation would 
cause redistribution between that generation and the elderly. It is not 
clear that it is efficient to combine these changes with other changes in 
average consumption against which this indexation would insure. I agree 
with  Merton’s  comment that the question  is  empirical,  in  that taste 
changes of  the younger generation may be an empirically unimportant 
component of the variance in aggregate consumption. But it is important 
to recognize that this is an issue, and that within the political process the 
choice of  index may introduce moral hazard considerations. 
A final comment on this issue is that one  factor which will affect the cost 
of  creating markets for indexed bonds and annuities is  the ease with 
which new contracts can be understood by potential buyers. Index-linked 
contracts are relatively easily understood  by market participants if  the 
index is the familiar consumer price index; they will for some time be less 
easily understood (and so harder to introduce) if the index is per capita 
aggregate consumption.  Even if  a per capita consumption index were 
preferable ignoring transitional costs, this benefit could be more than 
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The issues Summers raises concerning the indexation of  public pen- 
sions are very different, and basically are concerned with the effect of 
indexing on the politics of  determining real benefit levels. As such, the 
relevant questions involve models of  the political process. 
I do not agree with Summers’s position, but want to note that there are 
two ways of  looking at this, depending on one’s relative weighting of 
advantages and disadvantages as well as on the extent to which a public 
pension scheme is funded. The advantage of defining benefits (and con- 
tributions) in real terms is that a political decision to change these terms is 
clearly identified as a real change and not confused by  being mixed up 
with the inflation-induced real changes that would occur in an unindexed 
public pension scheme in the absence of political decisions. This has two 
effects. It enhances political accountability, through helping to clarify 
public  understanding  of  the issues.  It may  reduce  the uncertainty  of 
future real benefits and contributions, although this is arguable. These 
issues are the same as the arguments  for indexing tax rates. The disadvan- 
tage is the point made by Summers: namely, that there is inevitably a 
ratchet effect on benefits (and contributions) that is more binding in an 
indexed scheme. There seems to be widespread evidence of  demand for 
ratcheted indexing. This is reflected in the design of  private contracts 
discussed by Bodie and Pesando as well as in the design of public plans. 
The weights I give to these offsetting factors may be conditioned by my 
nationality. Canada’s public pensions are funded to a greater degree than 
is social security in the United States;  in this case, revealed social prefer- 
ence has traditionally given more weight to certainty. In the case of  a 
nonfunded scheme, the size of the future transfers is uncertain whether 
public pensions are indexed or not. 
In conclusion, I want to stress the interaction between the provision of 
indexed private pensions and the political demand for publicly adminis- 
tered pensions. One of the relevant indicators of the demand for indexed 
pensions is the extent to which political pressures for the expansion of 
public pensions are increased during inflationary periods. Such expansion 
has occurred in the United States (even if accidentally, through superin- 
dexation), and political pressure for such expansion has built up Canada. 
One of the major potential efficiency losses from the nonindexation of 
private pensions may occur from a consequent expansion in unfunded 
public pensions (with consequent potential effects on aggregate private 
savings) or in funded public pensions (with a consequent shift in control 
over investments from the private sector to the state). In this connection, 
the public’s perception  of  the issues may well underrate the extent to 
which  indexation  of  pensions  may  be  achieved  in  the  private  sector 
through the creation of new markets for indexed bonds and annuities. 
Efficiency gains from private pension indexation may include the preven- 
tion of inefficient political responses to public perceptions; these gains are 
no less important if the public perceptions are wrong. 257  Observations on the Indexation of  Old Age Pensions 
Note 
1. See, for example, chapters 8 and 9 in Feldstein  (1983). 
2. The closest existing asset is a portfolio of Treasury bills; see Fischer’s chapter in this 
volume. Treasury bills are an inefficient substitute for a safe real long-term asset for two 
reasons. First, the ex ante variance of real returns on bills is nonzero. Second, the expected 
return on bills is held down by their liquidity; in effect, long-term investors are forced to pay 
for an inefficient degree of liquidity in  their portfolios. 
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